

An Assessment of IMN'S Teachings and Embedded Factors Influencing Sectarian Conflict in FCT, Nigeria.

Abeire Denise Perekpo, Adah Amona Akpa,

Nicholas Stephen Bonoh

Abstract:

Shi'a-Sunni Sectarian fault line is threatening to redesign the map of the Middle East with an adverse effect on global peace, increasing terrorist cells, and heightened tension in Nigeria through IMN uprising in the face of state repression. In response to state repression after the 2015 massacre of Shi'ites by the Nigerian Army (NA) and the incarceration of Sheik El-Zakzaky, IMN employed procession and protest across northern states and, notably, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) to demand the release of El-Zakzaky. Subsequently, further repression and violent attacks were meted on IMN members by state security forces in Abuja, FCT. Using a thematic review, the study examined the historical insight into the Shi'a-Sunni crisis and the factors influencing the conflict that has lasted for centuries. Shi'a-Sunni conflict, which emanates from religious factors inherent in the death of Ibn Ali and the slaying of Husayn in the battle of Karbala in 680 AD, has metamorphosed into a political crisis with the Saudi-led Sunni and Iranian Shi'a jostling for control and propagation of Wahabism and Khomeinism, respectively. Subsequently, the conflict permeates the IMN uprising and Nigeria's sectarian fault line. The Consociational Model of Democracy was used as the theoretical framework to enhance peace as the model advocates a power-sharing and equitable representation of segmented groups to enhance proportionality and decision-

making in the political sphere. In conclusion,

the study avails that variations in Shi'a-Sunni teachings, poverty, and politics have enhanced the IMN sectarian fault line in Abuja, Nigeria. It recommends the use of positive peace through structural changes and employment generation by the government to curtail youth unemployment and idle youth that are easily mobilized by desperate politicians and fundamentalists to incite violence. In addition, employing the Consociational Model of Democracy with a success story in the post-Apartheid regime in South Africa and the post-Rwanda Genocide will be germane in curtailing the Shi'a-Sunni sectarian fault line in the country.

Keywords: IMN, Khomeinist, Consociationalism Model of Democracy, Sectarian Conflict

1.1 Background to the Study:

Shi'a-Sunni conflict date back to 680 AD after the death of the 1st Imam of Shi'a, Ali ibn Abi Talib and the murder of his son Husayn in the battle of Kerbala in modern-day Iraq by soldiers of the second Umayyad Caliph (Sergie, 2023; Holtmann, 2014; Long Term Strategy, 2007). The Sunni-Shi'a intra-religious conflict, which spanned centuries and rages in modern times, took twists and turns and was largely dominated by the Sunnis, with repression and

marginalization existing sideways. While the Sunni Empires such as the Umayyad, Abbasids, and Ottoman dominated the political landscape in the Sunni-Shi'a conflict, there was intermittent power usurps by Shi'a dynasties such as the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171) founded by a North African Muslim who claimed to be a descendant of Fatima and Ali, the Mongols led by Hulagu, the Assassins founded by a Yemenite Shi'a, Hassan-i Sabah, and the Safavid Empire founded in 1501 by Ismail I (Long Term Strategy, 2007). The conflict gained preeminence in the Ottoman and Safavid Empires with resultant casualties of lives and adverse effects on livelihoods (Manan & Taran, 2020; Coşgel & Yildirim, 2019) until the collapse of the Empires and the emergence of colonialism.

Preceding the Shi'a-Sunni conflict was the Umma (an Islamic community) founded by Prophet Muhammad in Medina after his journey from Mecca to avoid persecution. His death in 632 without a male successor led to a conflict between the two leading Muslim sects (the Sunni and Shi'a). While the Sunni preferred a pious and addict follower of the Prophet with vast knowledge of Islamic Jurisprudence as the Caliph, the Shi'a, on the other hand, advocated for a direct descendant of the Prophet. The Shi'ites believed that only a person with blood ties with the Prophet possesses the quality to fulfil the ordained order of God for Islam. Also, the Shi'ites believed that without proper consultations, the elite Sunnis swore in Abu Bakr (a companion of the Prophet) as the first Caliph. Shi'a favorite candidate, Ibn Ali (a cousin and son-in-law of Muhammed), held his cool and allowed the reign of Abu Bakr up till the third Caliph, Uthman, who was accused of marginalizing the Prophet's family. Consequently, Ibn Ali was sworn in as the fourth Caliph and first Caliph of Shi'a and was later murdered. The Sunni-Shi'a

succession conflict crescendo to a new dimension after the massacre of Ibn Husayn and twenty members of the Prophet's family at the battle of Karbala in modern-day Iraq in 638. Fearing a reprisal attack by Shi'a after the death of Ibn Husayn, the Sunni elites engaged in further persecution, expulsion, and killings of Shi'ites to exert political dominance and control (Sergie, 2023). In modern times, the Sunni-Shi'a intra-religious conflict, which spanned centuries, took a climax after the 1979 Iranian revolution, which in ripple effect culminated in the growth of radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq to suppress the majority Shi'a Iraqis and the emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to curtail the growth of Shi'ism and the Iranian foreign policy of Khomeinism (Sergie, 2023; Modica, 2015).

As evident in the forging, the rise of Khomeinism in 1979 resurfaces the conflict to a new height in the intra-religious struggle and suppression between the majority Shi'ites and minority Sunnis in Iran. Similarly, Shi'a-Sunni marginalization, suppression, and crisis can be seen in the Iraq crisis and the growth of ISIL (Sergie, 2023; Finnbogason, Larsson & Svensson, 2019; Nuruzzaman, 2019). Summing the Shi'a-Sunni fault line in the Middle East, Kubra & Zhen (2022: 169) avails that Sunni-Shia Muslim bloodshed rages in Iraq, sectarian strife stymies political reconciliation in Lebanon, and restive minority plague Sunni Gulf monarchies... It has also extended to Pakistan, a Sunni-Muslim majority country with a Shia minority that might account for as much as 20% of the population. The conflict, marred with repression and marginalization to exert political dominance, goes sideways as the Sunni and Shi'a sects employed violence and other means to enhance their growth with the mindset of curtailing the growth of competing Islamic sects. Highlighting the

sideways repressions, a study by Long Term Group (2007) avails that the Sunni repression of Shi'ites is evident in the massacre of Husayn and an estimated twenty (20) members of Prophet Muhammad's family by Yazid on 10th October 680 at Karbala, the mass execution of Shi'ites in 1926 in Medina and the levy of non-Muslim tax on Shi'ites during the reign of King Ibn Saud, the labelling of Shi'ites as "Fifth Column" and worst "Virus" than the Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, and the compelling of Shi'ites during the rise of Wahhabism in Arabian Peninsula to destroy the tombs of the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth Shi'a Imams by their own hands. On the other hand, the study avails that Shi'a repression of Sunni included the killings of high-ranking Sunnis during the reign of the Assassins led by a Yemenite Shi'a, Hassan-i Sabah, the killing of an estimated 20,000 Sunnis Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982 by the Syrian Government (seen as a minority Alawi sect that differs but is seen as Shi'a to a large extent). Similarly, Amanat (2017) avails that persuasive and coercive means were used to convert the largely dominated Sunni sect in the Iranian plateau to Shi'ism in the sixteenth century, whereas the Sunnis that rejected the conversion were massacred.

Outside the Middle East, Shi'a-Sunni conflict is evident in the Sampang region in Indonesia and West Africa, notably in Nigeria. Abidin, Faudi, Kholis, and Aziz (2020) avail that in the Sampang region of Indonesia, discriminatory government policies spurn a sectarian feud in the region, while the Yogyakarta region maintained a peaceful atmosphere due to non-discriminatory policies by the regional government. In congruence, Siradji (2013) avails that the internal family feud between the Tajul Muluk and Rois siblings metamorphosed into a deadly Shi'a-Sunni sectarian conflict to distort peace in August

2012 in the region of Sampang in East Java, Indonesia. In Nigeria, Khanabadi (2021) provided a detailed Shi'a marginalization by the Sunni-backed state forces and allies such as the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. It avails how the Nigeria Army (NA) fully knows that IMN will be celebrating their festival in Husainiyya Baqiyatullali, Zaria decided to fly the route to attend a less important military event at Jaji, Kaduna State. Hundreds of Shi'a members were massacred by the NA during the fiasco, after which IMN leader Sheik El-Zakzaky was incarcerated by the Nigerian government. In response to the unlawful detention of their leader, processions by Shi'a to demand the release of El-Zakzaky led to further repression and marginalization by the state security forces in Abuja. To understand further the sectarian fault line in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Nigeria, there is a need to delve into the historical account of the growth and penetration of IMN, which has become one of the leading Islamic sects in Nigeria.

The emergence of Shi'ism is contested in Nigeria. While Isa (2018) traced the origin of Shi'ism to the early encounters of Lebanese in Nigeria with Northern Muslim communities after the collapse of the restriction by the British through a housing separation plan in 1967. A historical account by Mohammad and Abdullahi (2019) suggested that the emergence of Shi'ism is traced to the return of Sheik El-Zakzaky as an emissary to Iran in 1979. As one of the leaders of Nigerian Muslim Students (NMS) and addict supporter of Khomeinism, El-Zakzaky was invited to Iran, where he met with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. His return to Nigeria birthed Shi'a in what is known as the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN). IMN employed measures such as propaganda, charitable deeds, and rural evangelism to amass a significant portion of the Sunni-dominated Muslims in the

Northern part of the country. In addition, Isa (2018) submitted that other enticing approaches adopted in spreading Shi'ism include coordinating welfare schemes, temporary marriages, economic empowerment programs, and rural evangelism.

In his vision and mission, in line with Khomeini's vision of an Islamic government ruled by the 'guardianship of the Jurist' velayat e fagih, and to emancipate the growing impoverished Nigerians, El-Zakzaky opted for radical and violent approaches to instill the Iranian styled Khomeinism in Nigeria. These approaches included advocacy for Sharia law, protest, civil disobedience, and a parallel state through its military composition (Mohammad & Abdullahi, 2019). The emergence and growth of IMN became a threat to the Sunni-dominated Muslim sect and allies such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US which necessitated various measures to suppress the growth and penetration of IMN in Nigeria (Khanabadi, 2021). Onapajo (2017) opines that Sunni-state-backed security forces were employed to clampdown on Shi'ites while, in the view of Sani (2018), measures such as the instruments of critical songs, open condemnation, and theological debates were employed by the Sunni sect to curtail the growth and penetration of IMN in Nigeria. Consequently, the growing repression led to confrontations with the government, the Sunni Islamic sect, and the public, which became a leading factor impeding peace in the FCT and Nigeria. Notable repression against IMN in Abuja, Nigeria, include the 2014 Shi'ite killings in Kaduna, where El-Zakzaky's son was killed, the December 2015 confrontation with the NA in Zaria, where an estimated 300 Shi'ites, including a wife of El-Zakzaky and Sheik Mahmud Turi, the leader of IMN Kano branch (Leadership, 2015) were killed. In addition

to the humanitarian killings, the Shi'a Shrine in Zaria was destroyed while Shi'a leader, El-Zakzaky was imprisoned afterwards.

The government's failure to release El-Zakzaky after his acquittal from all count charges by a State High Court in Kaduna State, Nigeria (Sadiq & Ahmadu-Suka, 2021), spurn into a series of protests and processions demanding the release of El-Zakzaky by Shi'ites across the country and notably in Abuja. On 26th September 2016, members of IMN marched into FCT to demand the release of their leader El-Zakzaky from which they were manhandled and stopped from entering Abuja by the police (Guardian, 2016). Furthermore, a clash between IMN and security forces in November 2018 during a procession of Arbaeen led to the casualty of an estimated 57 members (Okakwu, 2018). An estimated ten deaths were reported in the July 22 fiasco with the Nigerian military and police in 2022 (Achirga & Sotunde, 2019). It is necessary, in line with the foregoing marginalization and repression of IMN, to access the inhibiting issues influencing the repression and control of IMN penetration in Nigeria.

A significant factor embedded in the growing Shi'a-Sunni crisis that has metamorphosed into unrest and protests in Abuja, Nigeria, is the doctrinal variations in the Shi'a and Sunni sects. While Shi'ites and Sunnis are addict believers of Allah (God) and the hadiths of Prophet Muhamad, their differences are embedded in rituals and interpretation of Islamic laws (Sergie, 2023). The variations emanate largely from the Caliph's selection after Prophet Muhammad's death in 632. While the first three Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) were revered by the Sunnis as the "Rightly Guided Caliphs" and divinely blessed, they are seen as usurpers and nawasib (those who hate prophet's lineage) who are worthy of Fatwah and ritual cursing

during prayers (Long Term Strategy Group). In retaliation to the condemnation of the rightly guided by Shi'a, Sunnis polemicists such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab labelled Shi'ites as batini, people who engage in un-Islamic and superstitious beliefs such as undue reverence for Ibn Ali and the belief of the twelfth Iman, al Madhi as the restorer of Justice and ordained Gods order for Islam after his return from a cave. Despite the devastating impact of the Sunni-Shia conflict and unreconcilable differences that have created fissures in the Middle East, global insecurity, increasing intra-religious conflict in Nigeria, and civil disorder in Abuja, FCT, Shi'a-Sunni sects have bonded in critical times to wade-off their enemies. A notable example was the call for taqrib by al-Afghani to promote Pan-Islam, unity against imperialism, and the unification of Shi'ites-Sunnis in Iraq against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war despite the fact the Iraqis are predominantly Shi'a (Modica, 2015; Long Term Strategy Group, 2007). Based on the foregoing, the study was undertaken to assess the Shi'a-Sunni conflict by delving into the historical and contemporary factors influencing the conflict and deducing measures that will enhance Pan-Islam and peaceful coexistence in the FCT, Nigeria, the Middle East, and around the globe.

2.1 Factors Influencing the Spread of IMN and Sectarian Conflict in Nigeria

A critical thematic review deduced the following factors as germane to the ever-raging Sunni-Shi'a conflict that has distorted global peace through the activities of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIL, and their affiliated groups around the world.

2.1.1 Shi'a Contrasting Teachings with Sunni and the Growing Intra-Religious Conflict in Nigeria

While Sunni-Shi'a differences are embedded in the selection of the Caliph and

interpretation of Islamic law, they are deeply rooted in the reverential fear of Allah (God) and belief in the hadiths of Prophet Mohammad. The differences emanating largely after Husayn's death at the battle of Karbala in modern-day Iraq permeate divergent views on the Holy Qur'an (Long Term Strategy Group, 2007). The report avails that while significant portions of Shi'a belief in the Holy Qur'an, other Shi'ites believe that the Qur'an, which consists of 114 Suras was doctored during the reign of Caliph Uthman. Caliph Uthman was a Sunni that abhorred the Prophet's family and mutilated part of the Qur'an that contains information about Ibn Ali and Muhammad's lineage, which made the Qur'an shorter. Sunni polemicists who placed immeasurable respect for the Holy Qur'an see this as apostasy, which necessitates the branding of a Shi'ite as batini, a 'Fifth Column' and a "Virus" worse than a Jew, Christian, and Zoroastrian that was introduced by a foreigner, Abd Allah bin Saba, a Yemenite to sow a seed of discord in Islam (Long Term Strategy Group, 2007).

In Nigeria, Mohammad and Abdullahi (2019) submitted that besides the maulud (celebration of the birth of Mohammad) that is observed by Shi'ites and Sunnis, IMN's teachings promote activities such as the festival of Ashoura, muzaharan (demonstration), Tattaki (trekking in commemoration of the slain Husayn), and mu'utamah (annual maulud for Shi'a twelve Imams) that are marred with civil disorder and confrontations with state security forces. Highlighting further on the differences, the study revealed that based on the belief that the companions of Prophet Muhammad altered the Qur'an, they read a different version of the Qur'an and anticipated the unadulterated Qur'an by their Mahdi who hides in a cave in Iraq. In addition, contrasting to the fundamental of Salat, the IMN often delayed Zuhr to Asr time, called

Zuhraani and Maghib prayer to Isha called Magari-baini and similarly, IMN compelled its members to believe that Juma'a prayer is not mandatory until the arrival of Mahdi from a cave in Iraq (Muhammad & Abdullahi, 2019). The variant ideological and teachings of IMN translate into intra-religious contestation with the dominant Sunni sect in Nigeria as the Shi'ites are seen as apostates and heretics whose activities contravene the fundamentals of Islam. The growing variation in teachings and ideologies necessitates the questing for supremacy and control with a ripple effect in conflict and marginalization of vulnerable groups such as the advantaged demographic Shi'ites in Iraq before the 2003 election, Sunnis in Syria, Sunnis in Iran, Shi'ites in Pakistan, and IMN in Nigeria. Similarly, in Nigeria, the Shi'a-Sunni sects, in a tussle of supremacy, membership, and the quest to intensify the foreign policy of the Iranian-led Khomeinism and the Saudi Arabian Wahabism in the country, embark on aggressive propaganda, teaching, and in extreme cases battle one another for control and conquest of a place of worship (mosque). In a ripple effect, confrontations and rivalry over variant ideologies brew civil disorder and loss of lives and properties in Abuja, Nigeria.

The variation in the teachings of Shi'a-Sunni and civil disorder is evident in the ever-raging conflicts in Syria and Yemen as Manan and Taran (2020) submitted that the chaos and conflicts in the Middle East are largely a result of variation in the teachings and doctrines of the two leading Sunni and Shi'a Islamic sects. He posits further that the long-standing feud in sectarian doctrines between the Sunni-Shi'a Islamic sects is seen in the Saudi Arabian-led support to mobilize and cripple an Iranian Shi'a-led Houthi group in the conflict in Yemen. In a study on the Shi'a-Sunni conflict in Indonesia, Siradji (2013) gave a detailed

variation in the teachings of Sunni-Shi'a Muslim sects. He asserts that the Shi'a-Sunni sectarian feud was heightened as a result of a doctrine held by Shi'a who idolized and saw Ali as a sacred figure and regarded the three companions of Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman as infidels for wrestling power with Ali. The Sunnis, on the other, see the three as the closest companions of the Prophet with unquestionable Islamic faith whose character defamation by the Shi'ites is a source of enmity and rivalry.

2.1.2 Shi'a-Sunni Marginalization and Influence on Sectarian Conflict

Sunni-Shi'a suppression and marginalization emanate from the variations in interpretation of Islamic law and jurisprudence, which finds its root in the origin of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict after the death of the prophet Muhammad and the murder of Husayn at the battle of Karbala. After the battle of Karbala, elite Sunnis engaged in aggressive repression and marginalization of Shi'ites to prevent reprisal attacks and, simultaneously, curtail the growth and Shi'a activities in the Islamic world. Summarizing the Shi'a marginalization and suppression by the Sunnis, Sergie (2023) posits that Shi'a, whose identity is rooted in victimhood over the slaying of Prophet Mohammad's grandson, Husayn, in the 7th century, was marginalized by an estimated 1.6 billion Sunnis and labelled by Sunnis extremists as heretics and apostates. Similarly, Long Term Strategy Group (2007) posits that "in the beginning, however, the Shi'a lacked state institutions and thus, as a minority holding controversial and even heterodox ideas, were subjected to repression by the Sunni authority." P.2. The report further confirms that the repression climaxed during the Abbasid dynasty with the mass beheading and burial of Shi'ites, the assassination of

the sixth Imam, and the destruction of Hasayn's tomb in Karbala, modern-day Iraq. The Shi'a-Sunni conflict embedded in repression and marginalization is a bi-directional tool that the dominant group (either a minority group in a position of power like the situation in Iraq before the 2003 election or the situation in Syria) employs to marginalize the vulnerable group. Shi'a-Sunni marginalization ranges from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, among other) to Asia (Indonesia) and Africa (Nigeria). In contemporary times, the conflict is embedded deeply in poverty and politics, which are assessed subsequently.

2.1.3 Poverty and Politics as embedded factors influencing Sectarian Conflict and Influence on Peace.

Although Shi'a-Sunni intra-religious conflict is hinged on the ideological variations in the interpretation of Islamic laws and the selection of a Caliph, evidence has shown that politics and poverty are underlying factors influencing the growing Shia-Sunni menace that have impacted adversely on global peace, the Middle East, and the FCT (Khanabadi, 2021). Contrary to Khanabadi's view of IMN, which is modelled after the Iranian foreign policy of Khomeinism built on the Qur'anic notions of *mostaz'afan* (oppressed) and *mostakberan* (oppressors) to liberate the impoverished and marginalized Nigerians, Muhammad and Abdullahi (2019) submitted that IMN (an unstructured Islamic organization) capitalized on the impoverished and illiterate Sunnis in Northern Nigeria and ignorant scholars to propagate Shi'ism in Nigeria. Being an unstructured organization characterized by an unparallel security outfit, IMN, through its demonstration and violent underpinning, portrays Islam as a violent religion and a

divided house that discourages proselytes (Muhammad & Abdullahi, 2019).

Shi'a-Sunni sectarian fault lines with religious underpinning have become a political tool for elite Shi'ites and Sunnis to incite adherents for political gains and control. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two leading gladiators in the sectarian conflict, have often incited and sponsored uprisings to topple regimes and instill a new regime in the Middle East. Modica (2015) opines that the sectarian divide between the Shi'a and Sunni in Iraq is not the source of conflict between the two sects in the country; the conflict is influenced by colonialism and the authoritarian regime, which favored their supporters and marginalized their opponents, thus sowing a seed of discord and enmity between Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq. Similarly, Haddad (2013) asserted that the conflicting landscape in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq war is a nexus of political struggle between those clamoring for change (the marginalized Shi'a majority) and those threatened by the change (the dominating Sunni minority).

Also, In Turkey, the widespread clashes between "leftists and rightists in the 1970s were driven by sectarian dynamics as by political, ideological ones" as Shi'ites in the 1950s and 1960s threw their weight behind left-wing parties that were hostile to religion (Long Term Strategy Group, 2007). In Nigeria, Isa (2018) submitted that the ideological differences between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites in northern Nigeria, and other factors such as poverty and politics, factionalized the Muslim community.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Conflict Theory

Conflict theory was used as the theoretical underpinning to provide an understanding of inhibiting factors influencing conflicts and why conflict exists in the first place. There are various schools of thought on conflict

theorizing. The positive and negative schools of thought are leading dimensions of conflict. While the former sees conflict as a social fabric in society to foster social change and social transformation, the latter sees conflict as injurious, with the conflicting parties aiming to main and neutralize the opposing party (Coser, 2010). Despite these leading schools of thought on conflict theorizing, conflict theory is attributed to Karl Marx, a German political philosopher and economist of the 19th century. Marx's theory which was built on the methodology of dialectical materialism revolves around the exploitation and marginalization of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie who controls the means of production to subject the have-nots to perpetual penury (Daoxin, 2020). Marx opines that the continuous exploitation of the labor class will brew social stratification and class struggle resulting in a paradigm shift to communism. In congruence to Marx, Max Weber, and Wright Mills, German and American sociologists, respectively, provided empirical support to class struggle and social stratification embedded in economic factors (mode of production) but differ slightly in terms of class division. In addition to Marx's view of economic order as the influencer of class struggle, Webber took a deeper insight to include social and political factors in the class struggle. In furtherance to Marx's view of the struggle between two classes, Webber's view encompasses struggles within classes. Mills' conflict theory, in line with Marx, renamed the "ruling class" as the "power elite," which comprises business, economic, military, and political leaders that make important decisions with their status and well-being in mind.

Standing on the shoulders of the aforementioned conflict theories, the study enlisted key principles advanced by Sanderson (ND) to analyze the Shi'a-Sunni

feud, which has metamorphosed into unrest and civil disorder in Abuja through protests, processions, and confrontations with state security forces. Sanderson (ND) posited that conflict, which may be intra-societal or inter-societal, culminates into dominant and subordinate groups, in this case, Sunni and IMN, respectively, in Nigeria. To keep the sub-group in a perpetual lower stratum or bottom of the food chain, the dominant group often employs state forces, economic and political measures to suppress the growth and wellbeing of the sub-group. Khanabadi (2021) agrees with the assertion as he submitted that despite the well-conceived policies of Iran towards Nigeria through trade relations and positive incentives of IMN as a peaceful organization that engages in economic measures to enhance the wellbeing of meaningful Nigerians, the Saudi-led Sunni forces in Nigeria have employed violent measures to repress the growth of Shi'ism in the country. Similarly, in the pre-2003 Iraq election, the government of Saddam Hussein used state power to marginalize the majority Shi'a Iraqis by diverting developmental projects and major political appointments to the minority Sunni Iraqis. These repressions by the dominant group often translate to an uprising by the sub-group, as evident in the IMN crisis in Nigeria, the Shi'a-Sunnis crisis in Iraq, and the Sunni-Alawi crisis in Syria (Long Term Strategy Group, 2007). Having established economic, social, and political factors as the forces propelling class struggle, the consociational model of democracy advanced by Arend Liphart (1968) was employed to provide a lasting solution to the sectarian conflict in Nigeria. The consociational model of democracy is a power-sharing model of equitable representation among segmented groups to enhance proportionality and decision-making in the political sphere among competing sub-groups in a plural state. The

model comprises four characteristics of; a grand coalition, mutual veto or concurrent majority rule, proportionality in political representation, and autonomy for each group (Modica, 2015). Having achieved successes in the post-Apartheid regime reconciliation in South Africa and the post-Rwandan genocide, employing the model in the IMN crisis in Nigeria will enhance sustainable peace in Abuja, Nigeria.

2.3 Literature Review

Mohammad and Abdullahi (2019) assessed the spread of Shia and its activities in Nigeria by tracing the origin of Shi'ism in Nigeria to a factional body of the Muslim Student Society of Nigeria (MSSN) led by El-Zakzaky. After the refusal of MSSN to propagate Khomeinism in the country, the Iranian-led delegates, in appreciation of the MSSN visit to Iran, covertly enlisted the support of El-Zakzaky to expand the Iranian foreign policy in Nigeria. El-Zakzaky operated clandestinely until 1981, when in an Islamic Vocational Course (IVC) in Zaria, Kaduna State, his allegiance to Shi'ism became known to the public. The thematic study submitted that IMN lacks organizational structure and violates constituted law that mandates all religious organizations to be duly registered. The Iranian infiltrated IMN engages in activities such as muzaharan (demonstration), Tattaki (trekking in commemoration of the slain Husayn), maulud (celebration of the birth of Mohammad, which happens to be the activity agreeing with the Sunni sect), and mu'utamah (annual maulud for Shi'a twelve Imams) that are marred with civil disorder and confrontations with state security forces. Also, unlike Iranian clerics, IMN, whose clerics lack scholarly training, is characterized by structural deficiency. Besides notable individuals such as the late Sheik Muhammad Turi (Kano State), Sheik Yakubu Yahaha Katsina (Katsina State), and

the late Hamza Yauri (Kebbi State), IMN lack state representatives with a vested authority to oversee the state activities, which gives El-Zakzaky power to exercise undue control over IMN. IMN capitalized on factors such as ignorance among Islamic scholars, poverty, and illiteracy at the grassroots level to infiltrate and amass adherents from the Sunni sect in Northern Nigeria. In conclusion, the study avails that the activity of Shi'a, which contravenes the cardinals of Islam, is the biggest calamity to Islam after the demise of Prophet Muhammad and revealed that IMN capitalized on impoverished and vulnerable Sunnis in Northern Nigeria to enlist adherent and propagate the Iranian foreign policy of Khomeinism in Nigeria. It recommends that the Sultan be empowered as the legal authority to scrutinize the activities of Islamic sects in Nigeria to prevent religious anarchy in the country.

Providing a contrary historical account to the emergence and penetration of Shi'a in Nigeria, Isa (2018) deduced that the Shi'a Islamic sect was introduced into the country in the post-colonial era after the end of the British housing plan that incentivized contact between emigrant Lebanese and Hausa Muslim communities in Northern Nigeria. Highlighting the measures employed by the Sunni sect to suppress the growth of IMN in Nigeria, the study avails that Sunni literature was used primarily to abate the conversion of Sunnis to Shi'ism via mass production and distribution of works of literature to re-orient and avert Sunnis from embracing Shi'ism. The study concludes that the ideological differences between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites in northern Nigeria and other factors factionalized the Muslim community.

A study conducted by Anjide and Okoli (2017) to assess the new trajectory of Islamic extremism in Northern Nigeria: A threat-import analysis of Shi'a uprising

show that IMN spearheaded a series of clashes with state securities forces between 1979 and 1999 that resulted adversely on peace in Nigeria while, in contemporary times, the December 2015 fiasco with the NA has left an indelible mark with incessant protest and unrest in Abuja and northern states in Nigeria. The study concludes that the IMN has over a million members, which can easily be mobilized as fundamentalists and extremists to distort peace in Nigeria. It calls for pragmatic steps such as diplomatic, non-violent, and counter-narrative approaches by the government to negate the radical sect's anti-secular, anti-state, and violent doctrinal orthodoxy.

On the defensive side, Khanabadi (2021) embarked on a study to assess the impact of the Iranian 1979 Iranian revolution on the creation of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Contrary to the prevailing negative views on Shi'ism and the influence of Khomeinism, the explorative research revealed that IMN as an organization is a non-violent organization that engages in peaceful procession and employs legitimate mediums such as the Fudiyya schools and Al-Mizan to educate its members on the principles and tenets of Islam. It also showed that IMN was built on the Islamic principles of Mostaz'afan (oppressed) and Mostakberan (oppressor), which El-Zakzaky employed to emancipate the downtrodden from the shackles of oppression and poverty in the country. In addition, the study shows IMN as a leading organization engaging in charitable deeds through medical outreach, humanitarian services, and historical enlightenment through cinematography in a proposed film that seeks to broaden the knowledge gap on a cohesive pre-colonial Islamic Northern Nigeria. It concluded that the impact of the Iranian foreign policy of Khomeinism on IMN was ideal, spiritual, and methodological nature than the distortion of peace.

Haddad (2013) assessed Sunni-Shia relations after the Iraq war and attributes the changing landscape in Iraq to the political change of 2003, the growth in new media and social networks, and the quest for an alternative form of governance to the moribund authoritarian regime. The study avails further that the conflicting landscape in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq war is a nexus of the struggle between those clamoring for change (the marginalized Shi'a majority) and those threatened by the change (the dominating Sunni minority). Despite being a conflict spanning centuries, the repression and marginalization of a sect with demographic advantage by the ruling minority class paved the way for the new sectarian feud that has permeated the Middle East and created fissures in global peace. In conclusion, the study submitted that in a post-2003 Arab world where sectarian identities have attained unprecedented social and political relations, there is no fire more easily started than a sectarian one.

In a study of the Sunni-Shia divide, Sergie (2023) took a historical insight into the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian fault line that has metamorphosed into insurgent groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, threatening the map of the Middle East and global peace. The study traced the origin of Islam to the prophet Muhammad in 610, who died in 632. His demise led to conflicts between the Sunni and Shi'ites over succession, with the former advocating for pious and qualified individuals. The latter advocated for a direct descendant of the prophet, with Ali ibn Abu as its favored Caliph. Abu Bakir, a companion of the prophet Mohammad and a Sunni, succeeded as the first Caliph to the detriment of Shi'ites. The power tussle continued up till the emergence of Ali as the first Caliph of Shi'a and the 5th Caliph in 638. The sectarian fault line ensued in the battle of Karbala in modern Iraq, where the soldiers of the fourth Umayyad murdered

Husayn (the son of Ali). Sunni's dominance continued until the Safavid Empire in Persia, where fierce rivalry with the Sunni Ottoman Empire ensued until the collapse of the empires. Sunni-Shi'a sectarian feud **re-invigorated** in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and the questing to propagate the Iranian foreign policy of Khomeinism in the Middle East and around the Muslim world. The growth and penetration of Iranian foreign policy to Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Pakistan, and Nigeria (Africa) became a concern for the Saudi Sunni government, Israel, and the US. In addition, the penetration of Iranian foreign policy led to the Iraq war, the preeminence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a tight grip of power by the minority Shi'a-led Assad regime in Syria. Consequently, the penetration of Khomeinism with the aid of the US government toppled the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein in favor of the demographic-advantaged Shi'ites in Iraq. In a ripple effect, the regime culminated in insurgency groups such as al-Qaeda by the aggrieved Sunni minority in Iraq. The demise of the **al-Zawahiri** and the decline in activities of al-Qaeda paved the way for a splinter group, ISIS, in 2015 with a ferocity that engendered fissures and threatened to redesign the map of the Middle East. ISIS employed the growing penetration of new media and social networking to amass adherents in Europe and created affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Africa. The study deduced that the Shia-Sunni conflict that emanated from a succession tussle metamorphosed into political contestation with the Iranian-led Shi'a and Saudi-led Sunni fault line, creating fissures in the Middle East and culminating in global security threats.

Similarly, in a historical inquiry into the Sunni-Shi'a conflict enshrined in their

differences, Manan and Taran (2020) employed a library research method through heuristics, criticism or verification, interpretation, and historiography to show that sectarian violence of conversion of one sect to the other through persuasion, coercion, and killings climaxed in the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Also, the study revealed that the intention of Shi'a to seize power sparked off attempts for combat and intimidation of Islamic scholars and the Sunni Islamic sect, which spurned a sectarian feud in the Safavid empires with loss of lives and distortion of peace in the Empire. The study concludes that the struggle between Shi'a and Sunni in the empires resulted from tribal influence and competition hidden under the guise of religion.

Long Term Strategy Group (2007) did a study on a historical insight into the Sunni-Shi'a divide by x-raying the origins, theology, and geopolitics in the past and present. Starting with the origins of the Sunni-Shi'a split (embedded in the battle at Karbala in modern-day Iraq), it took a cursory insight into the martyrdom of Hussein, Sunni-Shi'a variations on Caliphs, Ali, and the Qur'an, and Sunni-Shi'a conflict. In furtherance, insight into Fatimids (Shi'a) and Abbasids (Sunni) rivalry was unraveled while rhetoric and repressive remarks (critics of Shi'a as apostate and heretic ideology introduced by a foreigner to sew discord in Islam) by Sunni polemicists such as Ibn Taymiya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were x-rayed in the study. Furthermore, the study showed how the dominance of Sunni empires such as the Umayyad, Abbasids, and Ottoman was threatened and toppled at some points by the Fatimid dynasty (909-1171) founded by a North African Muslim who claimed to be a descendant of Fatima and Ali, the Mongols led by Hulagu, the Assassins founded by a Yemenite Shi'a, Hassan-i Sabah, and Ismail

I who founded the Safavid empire in 1501. Highlighting Sunni-Shi'a repression and marginalization, which operated sideways, the study revealed that the Sunnis repression of Shi'ites is evident in the massacre of Husayn and an estimated twenty (20) members of Prophet Muhammad's family by Yazid on 10th October 680 at Karbala, the mass execution of Shi'ites in 1926 in Medina and the levy of non-Muslim tax on Shi'ites during the reign of King Ibn Saud, the labeling of Shi'ites as "Fifth Column" and worst "Virus" than the Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, and the compelling of Shi'ites during the rise of Wahhabism in Arabian Peninsula to destroy the tombs of the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth Shi'a Imams by their own hands. On the other hand, the Shi'a's repression of the Sunnis included the killings of high-ranking Sunnis during the reign of the Assassins led by a Yemenite Shi'a, Hassan-i Sabah, the killing of an estimated 20,000 Sunnis Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in 1982 by the Syrian Government (seen as a minority Alawi sect that differs but is seen as Shi'a to a large extent). While Sunni-Shi'a variations in jurisprudence, selection of Caliphs, and Qur'an necessitate intra-religious conflict spanning centuries, efforts such as Taqrib (reconciliation and coming together) were initiated by an Iranian Shi'a, al-Afghani to diffuse the impending threat of imperialism against the Muslim world. Notably, successes such as Shi'a support of a Sunni conference in Jerusalem in 1931 to revive the Sunni Caliphate and the inclusion of Shi'a Twelver Law among the four established Sunni schools in al-Azhar University, Cairo, were recorded as Pan-Islamic move against colonialism. The study concluded that the increasing Shi'a community in the Arabian Peninsula and the reemergence of Najaf as Shi'a academic center are leading concerns for Saudi Arabian Sunni control over the Middle East.

It recommends the dismissal of the claim and conviction by decision-makers in Saudi Arabia that Shi'ism is foreign and heretic.

X-raying also the differences between the Sunni-Shi'a sects, PEW Research Center (ND) revealed that while Shi'a place emphasis on the Ashura ritual and pilgrimages to shrines of saints (a leading example is the shrine of Hussein), the Sunni sect, on the other hand, shows less significance for pilgrimages to shrines of saints. This forms the major line of division between the sects, which has been the source of feud and quest for supremacy between Shi'a and Sunni in the region.

Elsewhere in Asia, the Shi'a-Sunni sectarian conflict of marginalization and suppression permeate into the Sampang region of East Java, Indonesia. Siradji (2013) avails that the conflict, which emanates from a domestic feud between the Tajul Muluk and Rois siblings, shelved itself as a sectarian Shi'a-Sunni conflict to distort peace in the region. Also, it avails that the conflict, which took a religious umbrella, had a political underpinning embedded in a power struggle, lack of intra-religious tolerance, and harmony between the two sects. Owing to their inability to co-habit peacefully, the families resorted to violence to settle disputes, as evident in the deadly conflict on August 2012 in the region of Sampang in East Java. In conclusion, it posits that regardless of the sectarian views, Muslims are created as brothers and bonded by a creed of truth to maintain peace and social harmony among themselves and humanity and creatures in general. The sectarian views should be seen as a result of a dynamic social and political environment and not religious underpinning. It thus recommends that Muslims should see the variant views as God's graces and blessings bestowed on them by God, which need to be respected to promote peace and social harmony.

Similarly, Abidin et al. (2020) studied between conflict and peace: The government policies and Sunni-Shia relationship in Sampang and Yogyakarta. The study used a case study design and qualitative method to show that the Sampang Shi'a community encountered discriminative policies and conflict while the Yogyakarta Shi'a community coexisted peacefully with the Sunni Islamic sect, which was a result of different policies introduced by the regional governments. The study finds also that the policies implemented against the Shi'a minority in Sampang and Yogyakarta include social, cultural, political, economic, and some other external factors. The study recommends that the regional government should implement the proposed politics of multiculturalism by Charles Taylor to enhance social harmony and peace in the region of Sampang and Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

2.4 Gaps in Literature

The ferocity of mayhem from insurgency groups in the Middle East and affiliated cells around the globe has drawn attention to sectarian conflict in the Middle East and its adverse effect on global peace. Empirical works abound on the Shi'a-Sunni variation and its impact on peace in the Middle East (Modica, 2015; PEW Research Center, ND; Long Term Strategy Group, 2007) and Indonesia (Abidin et al., 2020; Siradji, 2013), but empirical attention to factors influencing IMN uprising and peace in the FCT is relatively absent. Thus, the study was undertaken to fill the gap by deducing variation in Shi'a teachings, poverty, and politics as the issues influencing the sectarian fault lines in Abuja, Nigeria.

3.1 Research Design

The systematic literature review method was used for the study. A systematic literature review method carefully retrieves empirical

studies in a particular research area to deduce conclusions based on existing findings. The method placed emphasis on contexts, themes, theories, and scope to provide sound deductive research. The method is prevalent in health and clinical services there is a need to streamline findings in specific areas of health for easy retrieval of information for health care delivery (Nightingale, 2009). A detailed library search on works of literature with related themes was retrieved from Google Scholars Academia, Scopus, and Research Gate and sieved to provide a sound empirical investigation for the study. The information from the systematic literature reviews presented in a pyramid form affirms the following conclusion.

3.2 Conclusion

Sunni-Shia conflict is a sectarian conflict spanning centuries that permeates into present times with spillover adverse effects on peace in Abuja, the Middle East, and the globe (Sergie, 2023). Originating as an intra-religious conflict after the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 AD, the two leading power nations of Saudi-led Sunni and Iranian Shi'a have intensified their foreign policies to neighboring countries in the Middle East, Asia (Indonesia), and Africa (Nigeria) to sow seeds of political contestation and marginalization and the rise of extremist groups such as al-Qaeda, ISIL, and ISWAP (Abidin et al., 2020; Long Term Strategy Group, 2007). While variations in the interpretation of Islamic law and jurisprudence inherent in the battle at Karbala stand as the leading factors influencing Shi'a-Sunni conflict, poverty, class struggle, and politics in contemporary times account largely for the growing sectarian conflict which has impacted adversely on peace in Abuja, Nigeria (Mohammad and Abdullahi, 2019).

The IMN, which accounts for 12% of Muslims in Nigeria (US Department of State, 2022), is the second leading Islamic sect in the country. From the onset, it engaged in aggressive advocacies through charity deeds, propaganda, and rural evangelism to gain adherents from the majority Sunni sect in Nigeria. Fearing the consequences, elite Sunnis employed measures such as open debate, critical songs, criticism by polemicists, and state repression to curtail the growth and penetration of Shi'ism in the country (Khanabadi, 2021; Isa, 2018). The marginalization of IMN necessitates reprisal attacks through protests and procession, which connote the concept of class struggle envisaged by Sanderson (ND). From the standpoint of conflict as intra-societal and inter-societal, the dominant group employs state forces and economic and political measures to keep the sub-group in the lower strata of the economy. The foregoing ensues class struggle, as evident in the IMN uprising that has impeded peace in Abuja, Nigeria.

3.3 Recommendations

The study advanced the following recommendations in line with the findings.

1. Conflict as a necessary social fabric to usher in structural transformation and changes in existing societal norms cannot be separated from society as long as humans as social being interface with one another. Rather than employing the negative conflict resolution approach to curtail conflict from the surface level, the study advocates for a more encompassing approach of positive peace building. Positive peace seeks to curtail conflict by proffering solutions to the root cause of conflict. Poverty is a leading factor influencing conflict in Nigeria, as a significant 42% of the population lives below the poverty line (World Bank, 2000). This is a recipe for disaster, as fundamentalists and extremists often rely on

weak, idle hands to incite violence. There is a need for the government to engage in structural transformation and employment generation to absorb idle and unemployed youth in Nigeria.

2. IMN uprising stems from suppression and marginalization owing to skepticism of the leading Sunni elites and allies such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the US towards the growth and penetration of Iranian Khomeninism into the most populous black nation (Khanabadi, 2021). The growing repression and marginalization, as seen in the 2015 massacre of Shi'ites in Zaria and the detention of IMN leader, El-Zakzaky after his acquittal by the State High Court in Kaduna, spurn a wave of protest and procession in Abuja with resultant casualties of lives and loss of property. Against this backdrop, the study recommends the consociational model of democracy advanced by Arend Lijphart (1968) to provide a lasting solution to the sectarian conflict in the country. The consociational model, which advocates for a power-sharing and equitable representation of segmented groups to enhance proportionality and decision-making in the political sphere, successfully fostered peace in the post-Apartheid regime in the South and the post-Rwanda Genocide (Modica, 2015). Employing the model in the sectarian fault line in Nigeria will enhance peace and sustainable living in the country.

References:

1. Abidin, A. Z., Faudi, I., Kholis, N. & Aziz, T. (2020). Between Conflict and Peace: The Government Policies and Sunni-Shia Relationship in Sampang and Yogyakarta. *Esensia*. Volume 21, No.2. <http://ejournal.uin.suka.ac.id/ushuluddin/esensia>.
2. Achirga, A. & Sotunde, A. (2019, July 23). Shiite Protester Clash with Nigeria Military, Police in Abuja. Reuters.

- 15/04/2023.
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-shiites-idUSKCN1UIIRS>.
3. Amanat, A. (2017) Iran: A Modern History. New Haven, CT. Yale University Press
 4. Baba-Ahmed, H. (2015). Zaria. Assessed 07/23/2022.
<http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/columns/zaria/124870.html>.
 5. Coser, P. (2010). Conflict: social aspect (3rd). New York: Macmillan co (3). 83 -9
 6. Coşgel, M. M. & Yildirim, S. (2019). A Tale of two Plateaus. The Consequences of the Sunni-Shi'a Divide. A Paper Presented at the Economic History Workshop, Yale University.
 7. Guardian (2016). Shi'ites Condemn Disruption of Protest by Police in Abuja. Assessed 29/07/2022.
<http://guardian.ng/news/shiites-condemn-disruption-of-protest-by-police-in-abuja/>
 8. Haddad, F. (2013, November 15). Sunni-Shia Relations after the Iraq War. United States Institute of Peace. Peace Brief 160. Assessed 23/03/2023.
<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB160.pdf>
 9. Holtmann, P. (2014). A Primer of the Sunni-Shi'a Conflict. Perspective on Terrorism. Volume 8(1)
 10. Khanabadi, S. (2021). The Impact of the Iranian 1979 Iranian Revolution on the Creation of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. Iranian Politics and Law. Volume 1(1&2).
 11. Kubra, A. T. & Zhen, J. (2022). The Saudi Arabia and Iran Factor in Sectarian Conflict of Pakistan: Critical and Analytics Study in History and Contemporary Scenario. Open Journal of Social Sciences. Volume 10.
<https://www.scirp.org/journal/jss>.
 12. Leadership (2015). Army, Shi'ite Showdown: Army Arrests Sheikh Zakzaky, Kills Wife, Son, Mahmud Turi. Assessed 02/07/2022.
<http://leadership.ng/news/483106/army-shiite-showdown-army-arrests-sheikh-zakzakykills-wife-son-mahmud-turi>.
 13. Long Term Strategy Group (2007, January). The Sunni-Shi'a Divide: Origin, Theology, and Geopolitics in the Past and Present. Retrieved 26/05/2023
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Other/15-F-0940_DOC_05_CSBA-LTSG_Sunni-Shia_Divide_Origins_Theology_Geopolitics_200701.pdf.
 14. Manan, A. & Taran, J. P. (2020). The Sunni-Shi'a Conflict in the History of Islam: An Analytical Descriptive Study. Polita: Journal of Social Religion Research. Volume 5, No. 2. Doi: <http://10.24256/pal.v5i21327>
 15. Modica, K. L. (2015). A Path to Peace: Reconciling the Sunni-Shia Conflict in Iraq. Suracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects. 841.
https://surface.syr.edu/honor_capstone/841.
 16. Mohammad, M. S. & Abdullahi, M. M. (2019). The Spread of Shia and its Activities in Nigeria. Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities. Volume 4, No.1. Doi: <http://dxdoi.org/10.21580/jish.41.1755>.
 17. Nightingale, A. (2009). A Guide to Systematic Literature. Surgery Volume 27 (9).
 18. Okakwu, E. (2018, November 8). Death Toll in Shiites Abuja Killings up by 10-Group. Premium Times. Assessed 08/03/2023.
<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/294779-death-toll-in-shiites-abuja-killings-up-by-10-group.html?tztc=1>
 19. PEW Research Center (ND). Many Sunnis and Shi'as Worry about Religious

- Conflict. assessed 14/12/2022.
www.pewresearch.org/religion.
20. Sadiq, L. & Ahmadu-Suka, M. (2021, July 29). El-Zakzaki's Long Walk to Freedom. Daily Trust. Assessed 23/03/2023. <https://dailytrust.com/el-zakzakys-long-walk-to-freedom/>
21. Sergie, M. A. (2023, April 27). The Sunni-Shia Divide. Council on Foreign Relations. Assessed 23/05/2023. <https://www.cfr.org/article/sunni-shia-divide>.
22. Siradji (2013). The Sunni-Shi'ah Conflict and the Search for Peace in Indonesia. Journal of Indonesia Islam. Volume 7, No.1.
23. US Department of State (2022, June 2). 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nigeria. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/nigeria/>
24. World Bank. (2000). World development report 2000/01: attacking poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press